Hazard identification is the first and most crucial step in any risk assessment. Since the late 1960s it has been done in a systematic manner using hazard and operability studies (HAZOP) and failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA). In the area of process safety these methods have been successful in that they have gained global recognition. There still remain numerous and significant challenges when using these methodologies. These relate to the quality of human imagination in eliciting failure events and subsequent causal pathways, the breadth and depth of outcomes, application across operational modes, the repetitive nature of the methods and the substantial effort expended in performing this important step within risk management practice. The present article summarizes the attempts and actual successes that have been made over the last 30 years to deal with many of these challenges. It analyzes what should be done in the case of a full systems approach and describes promising developments in that direction. It shows two examples of how applying experience and historical data with Bayesian network, HAZOP and FMEA can help in addressing issues in operational risk management.
Introduction
All safety considerations start with recognizing possible hazard events, hence the necessity of hazard identification (HI) via process hazard analysis (PHA). Hazard identification has the objective of defining all possible (non possumus) scenarios or sequences of events in which a hazard with its associated chance of realization will generate risks to people, assets, environment or corporate reputation. The potential causing the hazardous situation can reside within the system for a long time or could result from a set of temporal conditions.
PHA is a basic step towards risk assessment and risk management of a technical system and its process. Throughout the history of process design and operation much was learned by trial and error. Today, prop- * Corresponding author. E-mail address: hjpasman@gmail.com (H. Pasman).
erties of materials are not regarded as a problem but 50 years ago they were. Many test methods did not yet exist. Phenomena such as runaway or vapor cloud explosion were unknown. Although sound knowledge of the material properties is a first requirement for a PHA, a conditio sine qua non, we shall assume for this paper that it is adequately represented, and we shall focus on finding out "how things can go wrong".
Early-on, it became already clear that an individual person is not able to think of all possible ways a mishap can occur. The first more or less formal method to evaluate plant process safety was application of a checklist based on experience. It required investigating properties of substances, reaction patterns, equipment hazards, safety devices, storage and loading, plant layout, emergency planning and the like. In summary, process hazard analysis (PHA), hazard identification (HI) and scenario definition form the cornerstone of the safety management system, and this is a team effort based on knowledge, experience, and human imagination of what can go wrong. In the next section we review the limitations of current methods due to the considerable effort, expense and the potential weaknesses in human imagination.
Following that, we formulate some research questions and ways to improve hazard identification and to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the effort. 
Current challenges and limitations
In considering the question:
"Are the conventional tools sufficient, or should and can we do much better?", it is helpful to discuss what is meant by "sufficient", and what constitutes "much better".
First, in relation to 'sufficiency' or meeting stated needs, practical application of techniques, such as HAZOP or FMEA, over many decades have certainly given excellent insights into the integrity of process designs and important operational aspects. However, these techniques have often been judged as not meeting needs for a variety of reasons, which are inherent in the methodologies and the particular manner in which they are applied. This is particularly evident in major accident reviews where deficiencies in HI were regarded as a major contributing factor in the accident.
The shortcomings can include: a lack of breadth and depth of analysis, a lack of team diversity and imagination, tedium, exhaustion, effort and expense, effective capture and communication of outcomes, follow through to final consequences, poor prioritization of associated risks, handling multiple operating modes, interaction with people and procedures, and the effectiveness of outcomes on decision making as HI outcomes are passed across various organizational groups (Kletz, 2009 ). All these issues can diminish the 'sufficiency' of the method and its applications: in some cases, with disastrous outcomes.
Second, there appears little objection against the idea that we should be doing better than the current situation. Past development efforts have focused on some of these issues with varying degrees of success. Others have stalled due to internal policies and procedures of companies that do not wish to disrupt existing practices and who remain to be convinced of the benefits of change.
Third, it is evident that with a growing focus on life cycle perspectives, accompanied by significant advancement in information and communications technologies (ICT), there are many opportunities to "do much better". Exploiting systems thinking and ICT advancements can drive beneficial change. What follows discusses these issues.
Since HAZOP is the main tool to identify scenarios, we focus on its limitations. In the first place there is the limitation in effort capacity. Conducting a HAZOP is labor intensive. To not lose focus, a team of five should work only half days on a project. Each P&ID requires about 5 × 20 h, and for a plant depending on size 1-6 weeks may be required for a HAZOP. As this must be performed in the design stage, once more before commissioning, and every five years after being in operation, the effort and costs add up. Meanwhile the results usually sit on a shelf and are not used in day-to-day operations; this also reduces its cost effectiveness.
Serious, however, are the limitations due to the range of personnel abilities and the quality of effort that can lead to the missing of key hazard scenarios. Baybutt (2015a) in one of his
